Wittgenstein on Köhler and Gestalt psychology: a critique.
Wittgenstein's objections to Köhler and gestalt psychology are critically examined. Principal features of Köhler's Gestalt Psychology are discussed that are relevant to Wittgenstein's views. They include Köhler's concepts of "subjective" and "objective" experiences, "sensory organization," and "empiristic theory." Wittgenstein's objections, which focus on the concept of sensory organization, are examined. Wittgenstein employs the term "aspect," which is derived from the findings of gestalt psychology, as a replacement for Köhler's term "sensory organization." After tracing his uses of aspect, it is shown that aspect is a superordinate entity distinct from 'sensory content' (colors and shapes). This dualism of aspect and sensory content is of the same kind that prevailed in the empiristic theory of visual perception. Wittgenstein's adherence to the empiristic theory is discussed. Finally, the difference between Wittgenstein's aspect and Köhler's sensory organization is examined.